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Abstract
Purpose: Poor teamwork and communication in
healthcare teams have been correlated to adverse
events and higher patient morbidity and mortality.
However, detailed insight into the link between
team communication and medical error is still
lacking. The objective of this study is to identify
the common characteristics of team communi-
cation among multiprofessional teams at four
Danish acute care university hospitals.
Method: Four focus group interviews with multipro-
fessional hospital teams (N= 24).
Results: Communication is particularly vulnerable
during handover of patient information between
shifts or units, when a team has to establish skills
and roles during teamwork and when staff has to
await and combine information from different
chart systems. Established frameworks for communi-
cation, mutual knowledge, ease of speaking up,
experience in getting the message through, and
focus on teamwork and communication promote
safe information exchange. Lack of standard assign-
ments and procedures, a flat hierarchy that leaves
responsibility unclear, different agendas for the
treatment of the patient, interruptions, and multi-
tasking, inhibit safe information exchange.
Conclusion: Power distance, team structure, and
hospital organization influence team communi-
cation and vary between settings and national cul-
tures. These factors must be accounted for before
developing or adapting team communication inter-
ventions to improve patient safety.
Keywords: Healthcare services research, Team
communication, Focus groups, Hospital, Culture,
Patient safety
Introduction
Poor teamwork and communication (for definitions,
see Table 1) between healthcare staff has been found
to be correlated to adverse events and higher patient
morbidity and mortality.1–3 Especially handover of
information during shifts or transfer,4 different pro-
fessional languages between staff groups5 and a
steep hierarchy that hinder free speech,6 have been
found to inhibit safe information exchange.
Improving both electronic7 and verbal team com-
munication8–10 are methods suggested to improve
the quality of patient care. However, so far the
results have been limited11 and adverse events
related to information exchange remain common,
with little evidence of widespread improvement.12
Further studies of the details of the link between
interprofessional communication and medical
error13,14 have been called for in order to develop
appropriate interventions.
The objective of this study is to identify the
common characteristics of team communication
among multiprofessional teams at four [Danish]
acute care university hospitals.
Method
The focus group method is used in areas with
limited previous knowledge and is well suited for
research on group practice, interactions and norms.
Like individual interviews, it is based on open-
ended questions with minimal interruption by the
facilitator. As opposed to individual interviews, it
relies on the interaction and discussion among
informants. As opposed to questionnaires or field
observation, the facilitator can ask for clarification,
elaboration, and inputs from other informants.15
We conducted four multiprofessional focus group
interviews among clinical staff members from four
Danish hospitals between November 2006 and
September 2007. Interviews took place within day
shifts and lasted 1.5–2 hours each.
The questions explored the main verbal multipro-
fessional team communication pathways concerning
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patient treatment, and factors supporting (promo-
ters) and inhibiting these (barriers):
• In which situations do you exchange patient
information?
• When does team communication function at its
best?
• When does team communication work less
well?
• In which situations do you experience loss of
patient information?
• What are the consequences of this loss?
• Which teams do you work in?
• When does teamwork function at its best?
• When does teamwork not function well?
• How will you describe the hierarchy in your
unit?
• What do you do when you are in doubt or see
something unsafe?
This focus group interview protocol was devel-
oped after thorough review of the communication
error, team training and focus group method litera-
ture, and a review of root cause analysis reports for
descriptions of circumstances concerning severe
patient safety incidents in six Danish hospitals.3
Furthermore, the questions were based on a study
of theories of appreciative inquiry16 and critical inci-
dent technique.17
The method was iterative and inductive: each of
the four interviews where part of a needs assess-
ment–planning–testing–evaluation cycle18 towards
improved team communication. Each interview
was based on the same protocol, but the facilitator
used experiences from previous cycles of action to
guide the questions and ask for elaboration.
Recruitment and sample
A convenience sample of four acute care hospitals
representative for Denmark (different regions and
both rural and non-rural areas) were included. The
hospitals selected the departments, and the phys-
ician or nursing managers at the departments
selected the informants who met the following cri-
teria: no leadership assignments, employed for
more than three months in the ward, exchanging
clinical information about patients in their daily
work, and engaged in multiprofessional teamwork.
Each focus group consisted of at least a doctor, a
nurse, and a nurse aid. The multiprofessional set-
up was chosen to encourage system-level discus-
sions in favour of discussions regarding particular
individuals or staff groups. Each group consisted
of both experienced and less experienced staff
members. For each interview, between four and
nine staff members were invited depending on the
number of relevant staff groups in the respective set-
tings. The participating departments were selected
in order to establish traits of multiprofessional
acute care somatic hospital staff. The interviews
took place in private conference rooms outside the
respective departments, to assure candour.
Informants received written and verbal information
about their interview, voluntary participation and
anonymity of their statements, and signed informed
consent forms. Danish law exempts this kind of
descriptive research from ethical board approval.
Data were handled in agreement with regulations
of the Danish Data Protection Agency. The inter-
views were facilitated by LIR.
Data collection and analysis
The interviews were recorded and transcribed ver-
batim by LIR followed by assigning of codes, del-
etion of all information identifying staff members,
units, or hospitals. LIR andMAM subsequently con-
ducted individual data reduction (where the content
of transcripts was arranged in tables to indicate
relationships and patterns) and extraction of main
findings. Hereafter the data were shared among
Table 1: Definitions of main terms.
Term Definition
Asynchronous
communication
Communication occurring at
different times via another
media (medical records,
e-mail, and voicemail)
Communication The activity of transmitting
information31
Error The failure of a planned
action to be completed as
intended or use of a
wrong, inappropriate, or
incorrect plan to achieve
an aim31
Handover The transference of patient
information and
responsibility between
team members
Hierarchy The organization of people
at different ranks in an
administrative body
Power distance The extent to which the less
powerful members of an
organization expect and
accept that power is
distributed unevenly
Synchronous
communication
Two-way communication
with no time delay
Team A group of two or more staff
members
Verbal Something expressed in
spoken words
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the research team before final categorization, extrac-
tion of conclusions, and translation from Danish to
English.
Results
Twenty-three informants (see Table 2) from five
different specialities, at four teaching hospitals, in
three hospital regions in Denmark participated at
their respective hospitals. None of the informants
(except one resident in anaesthesiology) had
received any training regarding team communi-
cation practices. Table 3 holds the excerpts regarding
main communicative pathways, Table 4 holds
excerpts regarding promoters of verbal communi-
cation and Table 5 holds excerpts regarding barriers
to optimal verbal communication. In each table the
right column holds the authors’ interpretation of
the quote(s).
Main communicative pathways
Informants described that even though asynchro-
nous communication such as handwritten and elec-
tronic patient records (EPR), electronic medical
records (EMR), and handwritten nursing charts
account for an important part of the exchange of
clinical information, the synchronous verbal com-
munication between staff members is indispensable
in team communication in hospitals. This has to do
with the fine nuances that the written information
cannot communicate. It is also a matter of urgency,
as the majority of doctors in Danish hospitals still
dictate their chart notes to tapes that are transcribed
to paper charts by medical secretaries. This leaves
the nurses waiting for new orders, unless they are
communicated verbally. Further, the written
information is often immense and unstructured
and staffs therefore have to rely on verbal peer-gui-
dance and verbal orders. EMRs are common in the
Danish healthcare system, but they are (still) too
slow to handle hyper-acute standard or acute non-
standard orders and the EMRs are not integrated
with the health records. Further, university hospitals
have a large flow of staff members on rotation
(mainly internists, residents, and fellows) who
rarely spend more than 12 months in the same
department. This means that a substantial part of
acute care teams consist of staff members, who
have never worked together before.
These findings are reflected in the excerpts in
Table 3, #1–5.
All together informants described the following
verbal communicative structures as the most
common:
1. Face-to-face communication:
(a) Between two staff members:
(i) Monoprofessional: Handover between
shift or units, or supervision.
(ii) Biprofessional: Handover between
shift, units, during rounds, or
supervision.
(b) In teams of more than two staff members:
(i) Monoprofessional teams: Patient con-
ferences or handover between shifts.
(ii) Multiprofessional: Surgery, deliveries,
or (bedside) care for an acutely ill
patient.
2. Non-face-to-face communication: Mono- or
biprofessional telephone communication (typi-
cally supervision regarding patient transfer or
verbal orders).
Table 2: Individual focus group characteristics with regard to staff group, specialties, and gender.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Total
Informants 4 8 9 3 24
Staff group
Senior doctors (>10 years clinical experience) 1 1 1 0 3
Junior doctors (<10 years clinical experience) 0 2 3 1 6
Registered nurses 2 3 3 1 9
Nurse aids 1 1 1 1 4
Clerks 0 1 1 0 2
Specialty
Internal medicine 4 0 0 3 7
Paediatrics 0 8 1 0 9
OBGYN 0 0 4 0 4
Anaesthesia 0 0 2 0 2
Surgical staff 0 0 2 0 2
Gender
Female 3 6 8 3 20
Male 1 2 1 0 4
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Table 3: Selected excerpts from four focus group interviews with multiprofessional hospital staff regarding main
communicative pathways
# Excerpts Interpretation
1 ‘We have two separate chart systems. They should
match but they do not always do that. There are
observations and orders in the wrong place. I have
the overview and [the doctor] goes to see the patients.
We supply the [missing] information (Nurse,
FGC20)
Written patient information account for an
important part of the clinical information.
However, most hospitals have separate chart
systems for nurses and doctors and the written
information is delayed. This makes verbal
communication between staff members
indispensableIt can take hours before we have the chart and we have
shifts where we have no time to look into it (Nurse,
FGC35)
It is frustrating, because we put a lot of effort in
writing the charts and they hold valuable
information. And it can lead to adverse events when
this information is lost. What I do is… I spend a lot
of time finding the right nurse and then say: ‘This is
the plan’ etc. To initiate a dialogue. In that way we
try to make the ends meet (Physician, FGC34)
2 We had a very sick patient in septic shock and he
needed two different drugs. We had to give it [after
verbal order] because it took two hours to enter it in
the EMR since the drugs were not standard. And we
couldn’t wait for that (Physician, FGC68)
Electronic medical records (EMRs) are now an
integrated part of the Danish healthcare
system. However, EMRs still cannot handle
hyper-acute standard or acute non-standard
orders. Verbal orders are necessary in these
situationsIf a patient needs an antibiotic then the standard
administration time is set to 8 PM. But if it is 5 PM
you need to call the doctor to make a single-dose
verbal order to get the antibiotics going (Nurse,
FGC79)
They are very much routine [the drugs] given after
verbal order in my opinion. Except if we have hyper-
acute situations with severely ill children. But then
you just have to go ahead and give it (Nurse,
FGC391)
I have tried giving a double dose of Furosemide. I
probably misunderstood [the verbal order] (Nurse,
FGC115)
We had an adverse event where a medical lab-assistant
called with a potassium-result. She said 5,2. We then
treated the patient for hyperkalemia. But later it
turned out that it was the other way round: it was
2,5. That it was too low (Nurse, FGC116)
3 Information is lost from one department to the other.
Especially nursing information, because (…) it is so
chaotic when it comes from a different ward. We
don’t have time to read that. A lot of information is
lost in this way (Nurse, FGC33)
Handover of patient information between
departments, shifts, and staff members can lead
to loss of information, patient safety incidents
and delays
I think a lot of information is lost between shifts. I had
a patient who needed a stomach tube for feeding.
And I told the nurse that the tube was for feeding
and I wrote it in the chart. But the next day I met a
colleague who said: ‘I have removed the tube. There
was no blood in it.’(…) That was very frustrating
(Physician, FGC90)
A doctor admits a patient and dumps the chart on my
desk with 10 blood samples on top of it and then
leaves. Then two hours later I find them and realize
he ordered three antibiotics to start immediately.
Why didn’t he say so? (Nurse, FGC217)
Continued
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Informants described the following situations as
particularly vulnerable:
1. Handing over critical, detailed, and compre-
hensive patient information between shifts or
units either face-to-face or on the phone
(Table 3, #3 & 4).
2. Establishing skills and roles during multipro-
fessional teamwork in larger acute care teams
(Table 3, #5).
3. Dividing tasks and establishing a plan for com-
munication and teamwork during teamwork –
with particular focus on multiprofessional
rounds (Table 3, # 5 and Table 5, #2).
Promoters of safe verbal communication
When asked ‘When does team communication func-
tion at its best?’ the informants could mention
several promoters of safe verbal communication:
• Frameworks: The informants spontaneously
mentioned the importance of established time
to communicate, agreements on how to
proceed, and confirmations of agreements
after a task, for instance during problem
solving in larger emergency teams (deliveries
and codes) or before and after rounds
(Table 4, #1 & 2).
• Knowing each other: The informants expressed
appreciation of working with team members
they knew beforehand, as this gave them an
idea of their experience-level and skills. They
explained this with the large turn over of
especially rotating junior doctors, whose per-
sonality, experience and clinical skills other
staff members had to decode in order to opti-
mize teamwork (Table 3, # 2 & 4).
• A flat hierarchy: When asked about ease of
speaking up between professional groups the
informants expressed that the power distance
in general is very low in Danish hospital
departments: Nurses usually have ease of
speaking up to doctors when in doubt or
when having concerns. The hierarchy is not
absent, though, but to a greater extent based
on experience. This is particularly evident
between the junior doctors and the experienced
nurses: Given that the residents change work
place over and over, they repeatedly and
swiftly have to adjust to completely new team
structures, lay-outs, devices, and logistics. In
these situations they often rely on the more
steady nurses’ or nursing assistants’ help,
Table 3: Continued
# Excerpts Interpretation
4 If a nurse calls you – I have tried this so many times –
and just say: ‘You have to come. The patient looks
queasy’ and then they have a hard time explaining it.
Then I have to consider: Do I know this nurse. And
[often] if I hear something so vague, then I can just
as well go up there because then they are not in
control of the situation (Physician, FGC200)
Phone calls pose a particular challenge to
information exchange. Especially when
communicating with team members one has
not worked with before or during acute
situations
When someone calls you for an emergent case at the
delivery ward it’s like: ‘It’s room 8, now!’. ‘But,
what is wrong with the child?’ ‘I don’t know. They
just told me to call you!’ (Physician, FGC537)
5 I went to a code today (…) and I started CPR (…) and
then I asked out in the room – there were 15 people
including three nurses looking on – if someone could
get me an oxygen tube. But no one reacted. I should
perhaps have said it again, but I was counting
[compressions]. So when anaesthesia arrived [and
took over] I ran myself to get the tube down the
hallway (Nurse, FGC56)
Information exchange during acute teamwork in
larger teams possesses a challenge especially
when it comes to task sharing
Sometime in the delivery ward if they have just
delivered a sick baby, and things go fast and we
arrive after the OBGYN has started CPR and the
anaesthesiologists arrive simultaneously, then it can
take us a few minutes to figure out who does what.
That is not ideal. But that’s reality (Physician,
FGC396–402)
EMR: electronic medical record; FGC: focus group code.
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Table 4: Selected excerpts from four focus group interviews with multiprofessional hospital staff regarding promoters of
safe information exchange.
# Excerpts Interpretation
1 It is about having time to communicate verbally.
Messages delivered on the run are often not interpreted
as they were meant. It leads to misunderstandings if
you don’t have a forum for exchange of information
(Nurse assistant, FGC96)
Frameworks like sufficient time, confirmations,
and feedbacks are important for reliable
information exchange
Communication is essential. I mean, sometimes it is in the
air, but then you realise the perception wasn’t
consistent [among the team members]. It is a learning
process to get it right and we must keep on practicing
how to say: ‘I hear this and we divide the roles like this’
so that everyone gets on the same page (Physician
FGC400)
It would be really great if those going on rounds together
agreed upon: How to do this?’ (…) and ‘When is the
round actually over?’ (Resident, FGC 1070, 1097)
Yes! ‘Can we agree on doing this?’ and ‘I just ordered
this’ or ‘I haven’t ordered this’ and ‘Please, remember to
order this’ (Nurse, FGC 1071)
2 Except the last group of internists, then I know all the
doctors. So, when I say something, then they know
what I mean (Nurse, FGC198)
Personal knowledge of the other team members
makes their information easier to interpret
The best grease is to know each other and each others
competencies. (…) [If it is someone I don’t know] then I
can get my doubts about what I encounter when I
arrive. Because I didn’t get exact information [on the
phone]. That’s what happens when you work in the
periphery [of the staff group] and with other
departments (Physician, FGC446)
3 If I forget something, then I know [the nurse] will say:
‘Didn’t we have an agreement?’ (Physician FGC65)
Staff express that there usually is a flat hierarchy
between team members
I think it is important to communicate with the nurse
about her opinion on ending the treatment. I often turn
to the nurses on their assessment (Physician,
FGC167)
Basically, if what you hear from the person in charge is
correct, then you listen. But if what they are saying
sounds wrong, then I am obliged to say: ‘Hey, did you
really mean that? Did you say 2000 mg?’ hoping they
will realize it wasn’t completely right (…) However, it
isn’t easy. It takes a backbone to speak up (Nurse
FGC406)
Nurses offer advice without invitation to speak
when they hold knowledge or have more
experience
Yes, they listen to what we say (chuckles). Especially the
new residents. They can feel insecure (Nurse, FGC
466)
If we have to take care of other things before we can go to
the ward [to see a new patient], then the nurses have
already observed something [when we arrive]. It is good
to know what they think when we are examining a
child. Do we need to admit [the child]? What to order?
And what tests should be carried out? We couldn’t
work without their inputs. We help each other a lot
(resident, FGC467)
I have no problem saying to the doctors: ‘Listen, I have my
doubts here. Can you help me? I haven’t tried this
before’. Then we always get positive response and help.
In that situation the doctors are amazing in taking care
of the nurses (Nurse, FGC471)
Continued
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who then become an even more valuable and
indispensable resource for the residents
(Table 4, #3 and Table 5, #1).
Barriers to safe verbal communication
The staff members were asked to identify situations
where communication was challenging or less safe
and identified the following:
• Lack of standard assignments or procedures: The
informants expressed a tendency to confusion
about ‘who does what?’ when procedures and
policies are not in place or unknown. This
was explained by a flat hierarchy between
especially junior doctors and experienced
nurses, which results in some tasks becoming
‘no-ones-tasks’ (e.g. informing patients of
changes in treatment plans, sending referrals,
etc). This induces a risk of tasks falling
through the cracks. The informants expressed
this as an important cause of delayed treatment
(Table 5, #2).
• Diverging agendas: It seems that doctors and
nurses understand each other well and to a
large extend speak the same professional
language. However, due to different pro-
fessional backgrounds, the staff groups have
diverging agendas regarding for instance care.
This can result in talk of cross-purposes (for
example ‘Is the patient ready for discharge?’)
and can give rise to tension (Table 5, #3).
• Interruptions or many similar tasks: Informants
described how a high workload, multitasking,
and interruptions are common working con-
ditions and how these situations often result
in loss of information or misunderstanding
(Table 5, #4).
Discussion
In this study we used focus groups to identify the
common characteristics of verbal communication
in multiprofessional teams at four acute care hospi-
tals, and the factors influencing them. The infor-
mants described the main verbal communicative
pathways as face-to-face communication in mono-,
bi-, or multiprofessional teams of two or more
than two, and non-face-to-face communication,
typically via telephone. This will not be surprising
for anyone familiar with clinical hospital life.
However, detailed descriptions of communication
outside the OR are limited.13
The most challenging communicative situations
described by the informants were awaiting and
combining information from the different chart
systems, handing over information, and responsibil-
ity between units and shifts as well as getting suffi-
cient information through when calling someone, or
establishing an acute care team during for instance
rounds or acute care. These results confirm the pre-
vious findings of the causes of errors during hand-
over.1,4 However, the issues of establishing mutual
agreement before and after the multiprofessional
rounds are new. This can have to do with the
mainly biprofessional doctor–nurse rounds in
Danish healthcare settings.
Our results cannot confirm that communication
errors are results of nurses being trained to ‘paint
the big picture’ and doctors being trained to be
concise, as previously suggested.5 Instead, our
data indicate that the two staff groups have differing
Table 4: Continued
# Excerpts Interpretation
4 I think that sometimes the young residents are put in a
dilemma, when we say: ‘We would give this’ or ‘We
usually do this’. You overwhelm them. Because in the
end it is their responsibility. So I try not to do that
(Nurse FGC 1023)
Knowing the way through the system can make
a team member an authority – regardless of
professional background
It is both a question of personality and experience. I was
in the ward for quite a while, so I went from being
completely new to being in a position where I could say
[to the nurses]: ‘I know we could do that, but we wont
because I want to do something else’. Now I dare take
charge. But in the beginning I relied on [the nurses] to
say: ‘Shouldn’t you call your senior resident
now?’ (…) It is a question of personality if you like
someone else taking charge or not. I don’t mind them
helping me or that we help each other (Resident, FGC
1025)
EMR: electronic medical record; FGC: focus group code.
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Table 5: Selected excerpts from four focus group interviews with multiprofessional hospital staff regarding barriers to
safe information exchange.
# Excerpts Interpretation
1 There is a large degree of equalizing among the staff
groups (…) However; sometimes you must be aware of
not letting everyone do everything. For instance it is
very frustrating if I refer someone to something and then
they return [for at control visit] (…) after three months
and you realize the referral landed somewhere in no mans
land, because someone assumed the doctor handled the
paperwork. That is very unsatisfying for the patients
(Resident, FGC475)
A flat hierarchy makes task sharing blurred and
can result in patient safety incidents if the team
does not agree on how to share tasks from case
to case
So the hierarchy becomes so flat, that confusion arises on
who takes care of…? (Interviewer, FGC480)
As a matter of fact, yes. There are actually tasks that are
foolish to leave to the doctor. It is outrageous to make a
doctor mail something. Talk about patient safety
incidents! (Resident, FGC 481)
I would like to hear inputs on this from other staff groups
(Interviewer, FGC 482)
The problem arises when you omit to communicate. If the
doctor says: ‘I’ll write a referral’. Then I think to my self:
‘Very well, then that’s done’. And then later I might
wonder: ‘Was it actually send? Do I have to do it or did
he do it? And when I look in the chart it just says:
‘Referral written’. And if it is a busy day then I don’t
have time to check if the referral is send as well. And then
you realise – perhaps the next day – that it wasn’t. If the
doctor just said: ‘I’ll write the referral. Will you handle
the paperwork?’ Then I would of course do it (Nurse,
FGC483)
To use a common headline then I guess it is that the staff
groups have become more blurred on the basis of ‘no tasks
are finer than others what so ever’. And to prove that,
everyone has to do everything’ (Physician, FGC 490)
The doctor who wants to order [something] himself, he can
order away. And if he won’t then we would love to help
you (laughs) (Nurse, FGC 491)
2 Sometimes the two worlds clash (…) because we have
different agendas even though we have this flat structure.
[As a nurse] I have to choose: Do I want to spend ten
minutes weighing the patient – which is important – or
do I want to spend ten minutes on communicating [with
the doctors before their rounds]. There, our two worlds
are different after all. But there are no established
procedures on how to do things in this unit. It is very
intuitive and we run it our own way (Nurse, FGC531)
Even though the hierarchy is flat there are still
different agendas between staff members. This
can result in confusion, talk on cross-purposes
and patient safety incidents where there are no
guidelines for the teamwork
Some doctors say: ‘Is the blood pressure okay? [If so] the
patient is ready for discharge’ But we have a different
agenda which includes: Can the patient go to the
bathroom and manage themselves at home? And
sometimes I think the [doctors] lack a little
understanding… that we talk on cross-purposes. I mean
(to the doctor): You believe the patient can manage. And
then you say to me: ‘Oh, so you don’t want to discharge?
That costs so and so much’ (Nurse, FGC1044)
3 In our unit (…) we get interrupted all the time. You have a
lot on your plate and get more all the time and someone
comes and interferes with what you are doing (…) There
can be three people talking to you at the same time.
That’s how the days go by (Nurse, FGC97)
Simultaneous tasks and interruptions challenge
communication
EMR: electronic medical record; FGC: focus group code.
Rabøl et al. Promoters and barriers in hospital team communication
136 Journal of Communication in Healthcare 2012 VOL. 5 NO. 2
agendas, which the staff groups are aware of. In
most instances, this is beneficial to the patient – as
long as divergences are resolved, for instance after
rounds. Techniques suitable for this purpose are
pre- and postoperative debriefings.19
The informants described the main promoters
of safe team communication as well-established
frameworks (time, guidelines, and structures) for
communication as important. This is previously
described, and the use of communicative structures
(like the ‘SBAR’ technique) to support team com-
munication has been suggested.5 Lack of knowledge
of other team members’ skills is a known risk factor
from the surgical environment. Together with the
perceived lack of standard assignments and pro-
cedures to establish ‘who does what’, and the per-
ceived differing agendas for the treatment of the
patient, this confirms a need for a tool to ensure
communication and mutual agreement before a
task. A method that has been successful in this situ-
ation, is a checklist-aided perioperative briefing pro-
cedure, which includes a brief presentation of team
members and division of tasks.20
The perception of a flat hierarchy, which allows
everyone to speak up, differs from previous find-
ings. This probably has to do with both the national
culture in Denmark and the organizational structure
in Danish hospitals: Denmark is a fairly egalitarian
society both economically and culturally. The
Danish national culture is based on a social demo-
cratic welfare model and an ideal of economic redis-
tribution.21,22 The Danish universal health care
system is 85% publicly financed. Hospital doctors
are employed by the public hospitals and affiliated
with a department – not with private clinics in the
community.23 Biprofessional nurse–doctor rounds
are the norm and salaries are relatively uniform.
This differs from the descriptions of culture and
organization in American hospitals, where a
higher degree of private funding and the affiliation
of independent private physicians and surgeons
who tend to their own patients result in a more dis-
tinct hierarchical team structure. This team structure
is considered an important source of miscommuni-
cation, because intimidation is thought to inhibit
free speech.6,24 Comparative studies of safety cul-
tures in hospital environments are rare, but a
recent publication supports our findings.25 The cul-
tural element in team communication is plausible as
communication is influenced by context, environ-
ment, and culture.22,26
These and our results justify adaptation of inter-
ventions to improve team communication. A
culture similar to the Danish is found throughout
Scandinavia and in some European countries.22
Patient safety curriculum planners in these systems
have to consider the above characteristics before
implementing American-based patient safety sol-
utions into their own hospitals.
Limitations
The multiprofessional focus group method was
chosen to allow informants with different back-
grounds and agendas to discuss team communi-
cation from a system-perspective, and allow the
facilitator to ask for elaboration or clarification.
Individual interviews could have resulted in focus
on particular inadequacies of other (non-present)
staff groups. By selecting multiprofessional focus
groups, the focus was directed to the system and
the organization. The study was preceded by a text
analysis of a sample of root cause analyses, which
served to generate questions to informants.3
However, an observation of nurse–physician team-
work could have aided in confirming results and
in providing additional insight.
The informants were picked by their unit leaders
and not randomly. This model holds a risk of selec-
tion bias, as unit leaders might have selected more
frank nurses, whom they knew would speak up
during the interviews. This could give rise to an
impression of a more flat hierarchy than in reality.
However, the results were in agreement with
results from other domains22,26 and a large-scale
simultaneous patient safety culture survey.27 A
bias that draws in the other direction is the multi-
professional set-up, which might have inhibited
free speech and made some informants confirm
opinion of others.15
We aimed at including a representative sample of
professions and disciplines with varying degrees of
experience from somatic acute care university hospi-
tals in Denmark. Although the results might not be
applicable to every unit and every hospital in the
country, we found the statements consistent. As
the interviews were to some extend inductive, we
did not reach data saturation on all matters.
However, the replies were consistent here as well.
As seen in Table 2, the unpredictable every-day
clinical life prevented optimal composition of all
four groups. This is probably not easy to prevent.
The way to leave out the effect of too small and
too large groups is to include more focus groups
in a future study. Other authors have used even
smaller samples28,29, though, and our results are
confirmed by the other sources mentioned above
that points in the same direction.
There is a general risk of confirmation bias when
interpreting interview statements. However, we
aimed at limiting bias by letting two independent
Rabøl et al. Promoters and barriers in hospital team communication
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researchers with differing pre-understandings of
healthcare (an MD and a sociology master) review
and extract trends.
Conclusion
The informants described the main promoters of
safe team communication as well-established frame-
works for communication, knowledge of other team
members’ skills and experience in combination with
a flat hierarchy, which allows everyone to speak up.
Several detailed ready-made interventions have
been published.30–32 However, our results underscore
the need for, first, adaptation based on feedback from
participants, which is in line with the approach
suggested by action research theories33 and second,
a pilot testing of the intervention as recommended
for curriculum planning.34 These factors should be
considered when developing interventions to
improve team communication and patient safety.35
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